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According to the apocryphal (but believable) quote attributed
to career bank robber Willie Sutton, he robbed banks because
1
“that’s where the money is.” Mindful of the temptations large
† Deputy Counsel, Rudy Giuliani Presidential Committee, and a veteran of
four recounts of statewide elections in three states from 2004–2006. Seattle
University School of Law, J.D. cum laude, 1996. Thanks to Julie Devine of Drexel
University College of Law for her outstanding research assistance.
1. Steve Cocheo, The Bank Robber, the Quote, and the Final Irony, A.B.A.
BANKING J., Mar. 1997, at 71, available at http://www.banking.com/ABA/profile
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collections of money present, banks employ extensive security
mechanisms to protect against Sutton’s progeny: vaults, cameras,
alarms, guards, and more.
For those who crave not wealth, but political power, another
target beckons more forcefully than the bank: the election, which is
where the votes are. Recognizing this, states have adopted an
extensive array of security mechanisms to protect elections against
the progeny of Chicago’s first Mayor Daley, Louisiana’s Huey Long,
2
and Texas’ John Connally.
One protective measure used in a majority of states is to allow
private actors, usually individual citizens or political parties, to
monitor the election process in a sanctioned capacity. In most
states these private actors have official standing to affect the process
3
by challenging voter registrations, voters, or absentee ballots. As
candidates, political parties, and interest groups search for
additional ways to influence electoral results, private monitoring is
likely to become more prominent in future elections, as are
disputes about its use.
I.

PRIVATE MONITORING’S PLACE IN THE SYSTEM

Election systems are complex operations with many points
where things can go wrong. Election officials use audit procedures
4
and technology to guard against fraud and errors. Sometimes
these systems are effective, and at other times they are not. When
the stakes are high for a particular election, the candidates or
political parties involved may seek judicial intervention to give
them the right to monitor the process above and beyond what
official procedures and their statutory rights provide. Alternately,
they may find on close scrutiny that their statutory rights are
inadequate or ambiguous and ask a court to expand them so they
5
are not left to rely on election officials to protect their interests.
Elections are hardly the only area where private parties play a role
6
in monitoring and enforcement; many such rights exist in statute.

0397.htm.
2. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Believe It or Not, Voting is Almost Free of Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at A10; Kaye Northcott, I Reminded Everybody of Lyndon, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, § 7, at 9.
3. See infra Parts II.C, III.D, and IV.C.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.D.
6. See infra Part I.E.
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A. Official Protections—Audit Proccesses and Technology
States employ a wide array of tools to protect the integrity of
7
Tracking voters and ballots in the hundreds of
elections.
thousands or even millions presents a challenge not unlike tracking
the millions of packages shipped by FedEx or UPS or the billions of
dollars that flow through a bank each day. There must be a system
to ensure that only eligible voters are able to cast ballots, that the
number of ballots tabulated matches actual voters who voted, that
ballots are secure from tampering, and that the tabulated results
accurately reflect the will of the voters. In almost every state,
elections are administered at the county or town level, so there are
thousands of different systems used around the country and a
comparable number of different ways elections can succeed or fail.
To detect problems in an election, administrators use an array
of audit mechanisms. Common audit tools include systems to
record the number of ballots printed, used, and remaining; ballot
accountability forms where precinct election workers reconcile the
number of ballots with the number of voters signing in to vote; and
8
tracking of absentee ballots received, counted, and rejected.
In addition to audit tools, technology also plays a role in
protecting election operations. One major role for technology is in
the processing and monitoring of absentee ballots. Maricopa
County, Arizona, has implemented a sophisticated system for
producing and tracking absentee ballots that was recognized by the
9
National Museum of American History in 2000. It is no accident
that Maricopa County would be a leader when it comes to absentee
ballots. In the 2004 election, 41.5% of the county’s ballots—
10
503,516 out of 1,211,963—were cast as absentee votes. By 2006
the percentage had climbed even higher, when 49.1% of 899,484
7. See MARIE GARBER, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, INNOVATIONS IN ELECTION
ADMIN. 10: BALLOT SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1995), available at
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/innovations-in-election-administration10-ballot-security-and-accountability.
8. See id.
9. Maricopa County Elections Vote-By-Mail in Smithsonian, http://recorder.
maricopa.gov/htm/web7.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
10. FINAL REPORT OF THE 2004 ELECTION DAY SURVEY, U.S. ELECTION
ASSISTANCE COMM’N (2005) [hereinafter “FINAL REPORT”], available at
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/clearinghouse/2004-election-day-survey/
(follow “State Data Tables” hyperlink, then select “Arizona_Jurisdictions.xls”
spreadsheet, then select “Ballots Counted” and “Turnout Source” Tabs). The
Arizona spreadsheet lists Maricopa County’s absentee ballots as “early” ballots,
because in Arizona absentee and early votes are cast using the same system.
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11

ballots were cast as absentee. At this level, an error rate as small as
one-half of one percent could affect 2500 votes in the county.
Audit techniques and technology are needed to protect against
two common problems with elections. The first is simple error.
With so many pieces of paper, and so many voters, and so many
election workers involved, some degree of error is inevitable. With
many poll workers being temporary employees who only serve a few
days a year, it is expected that the incidence of human error can be
even higher. Recognizing the tendency of mistakes to cloud
election results, one election official noted that part of the reason
machines are used to count ballots is precisely that a human being
counting 500 pieces of paper might find 499 one day and 501
12
When the task is keeping track of hundreds of
another.
thousands of ballots and making sure the number counted
corresponds to the number validly cast, the risk of error is
exponentially greater.
The second reason for using audit techniques and technology
13
is to protect elections against the Willie Sutton problem —robbing
votes. For as long as there have been elections there have been
14
efforts to manipulate them, so it is no surprise that complex and
varied systems have developed to protect them.
Effective auditing and accurate technological tools can detect
fraud and, by increasing the likelihood of detection, deter it from
occurring in the first place. Sometimes official processes work to
identify errors and fraud, and sometimes they do not.
B. Official Protections—Success Stories
The States of Washington and Missouri provide recent
examples where official procedures worked to identify and address
problems in the election system. In Washington, employees of the
11. See Maricopa County Election Results, General Election, 11/07/2006,
http://recorder.maricopa.gov/electionresults/electionresults06.aspx?election=
GENERAL+ELECTION%2c+11%2f07%2f2006 (select “Registration and Turnout,”
then select “All Voters”) (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
12. Andrew Garber, Top Vote-Getter? We May Never Truly Know, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2004, at A1.
13. See Cocheo, supra note 1, at 71.
14. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638
th
n.26 (2007) (providing examples of fraud concerns in the 20 century); E.S.
STAVELY, GREEK AND ROMAN VOTING AND ELECTIONS 113–17 (1972) (stating it is
likely that opportunities for deliberate fraud were numerous in the Greeks’ voting
and allotment procedures).
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Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN) submitted more than 1700 fraudulent voter registration
forms, an act the secretary of state called “the worst case of voter15
registration fraud in the history of the state . . . .”
Election
officials spotted the fraudulent submissions and initiated law
enforcement actions that resulted in criminal charges against the
organization (settled under a deferred prosecution agreement that
16
included payment of $25,000 for investigative costs).
In Missouri, several ACORN workers pleaded guilty to
17
submitting false voter registration documents. As in Washington,
election officials identified and prosecuted the fraud, and one of
18
the workers was sentenced to 120 days in a halfway house.
In another example, the county elections administrator in
Bexar County, Texas acted to remove 330 non-citizens from the
19
voter rolls. The individuals were discovered after they returned
jury summonses to the court, claiming ineligibility because they
were not citizens of the United States; nonetheless, they were
20
already registered to vote. This is also an example of elections
officials detecting and acting to correct a problem without
intervention from private parties. Unfortunately, the corrective
action did not come in time to prevent forty-one of the non-citizens
21
from voting in local, state, and federal elections.
C. Official Protections—Failures
Other examples inspire less confidence in official oversight of
election processes. When the initial vote count showed the 2004
election for Governor of Washington separated by 261 votes out of
nearly three million, investigators working for the political parties

15. Keith Ervin, Felony Charges Filed Against 7 in State’s Biggest Case of VoterRegistration Fraud, SEATTLE TIMES, July 26, 2007 (quoting Secretary of State Sam
Reed).
16. Id.
17. Mark Morris, ACORN Worker Enters Guilty Plea, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 7,
2007, at B5; Mark Morris, Former ACORN Worker Pleads Guilty to Voter Registration
Fraud, KAN. CITY STAR, May 17, 2007; Tony Rizzo, ACORN Worker Enters Guilty Plea,
KAN. CITY STAR, June 7, 2007, at B3.
18. Woman Sentenced in Voter Fraud, KAN. CITY STAR, July 28, 2007, at B3.
19. Noncitizens Likely Voted in Bexar County, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 10,
2007; Guillermo X. Garcia, Vote Fraud Probed in Bexar, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
June 9, 2007, at 1A.
20. Garcia, supra note 19.
21. See id.
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22

learned that voters who had been issued provisional ballots in
some counties were able to place those ballots directly into
tabulators rather than returning them to elections officials for later
23
verification as required by law.
While the exact number of these errors was never found, the
judge who heard the ensuing election contest found evidence that
425 provisional ballots in two counties were placed in tabulators
24
One reason this problem was
without first being verified.
detected was that political party observers in polling places on
election day saw voters receive provisional ballots and place them
25
directly in tabulators.
In the 1996 election for the 46th Congressional District of
California, Loretta Sanchez defeated incumbent Robert Dornan by
26
Dornan contested the election in the House of
984 votes.
27
Representatives. The investigating committee found evidence of
944 invalid votes, including 278 cast by immigrants who were
registered to vote while attending classes preparing them to
28
become American citizens. The committee determined that “had
the Task Force and Committee not acted to consider the merits of
this contest, significant vote fraud and vote irregularities would
29
have gone undetected . . . .” In other words, the normal checks in
the system did not catch them.
A humorous attempt to highlight flaws in the election system
led to official monitoring systems identifying a problem, but taking
an embarrassingly long time to do it. Jane Balogh of Federal Way,
22. Provisional ballots are issued to voters who arrive at a polling place and
claim to be registered and eligible to vote, but whose names cannot be found on
the list of registered voters at the polling place. The completed provisional ballots
are placed in envelopes with information about the voter. If later review
determines that the person who cast the ballot is in fact registered and eligible, the
envelope is opened and the ballot is tabulated. See U.S. Election Assistance
Comm’n, Provisional Voting, http://www.eac.gov/election/practices/bpea/havachecklist/provisional/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.207 (2006). For a more detailed description of
the errors, see Keith Ervin, Election Scrutiny Reveals Provisional-Vote Flaws, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005 [hereinafter Ervin, Election Scrutiny]; see also Keith Ervin, GOP
Says Hundreds of Ballots Suspect, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005.
24. Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3, Court’s Oral Decision at 5
(Wash. Chelan County Ct. June 6, 2005), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/
documentvault/CourtsOralDecision-629.pdf.
25. See Ervin, Election Scrutiny, supra note 23.
26. H.R. REP. NO. 105-416, at 2 (1998).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 31−32, 35.
29. Id. at 16.
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Washington, obtained telephone service in the name of her dog
30
and used the phone bill to register the dog to vote. She then
31
submitted absentee ballots in the dog’s name in three elections.
Her intention was not to cast fraudulent votes, but to point out the
32
weaknesses in the voter registration system. To make this clear,
she wrote “void” on the ballots, without marking any votes, and
placed a paw print on the outside of the absentee ballot envelopes
33
in the space for the voter’s signature. After the third time she sent
in a ballot signed with a paw print, election officials contacted her
and she was charged with making a false statement to a public
34
official.
As these examples show, relying on election officials to spot
errors and fraud leads to mixed results. Private monitoring of
elections can supplement the work of public officials, whether it is
performed by nonpartisan groups whose sole interest is the
integrity of the process or by political parties and candidates
playing roles in an adversary system.
D. Seeking Judicial Rights to Private Party Monitoring
The actors in the political process clearly believe that their
ability to conduct private party monitoring of elections is
important. Sometimes, private parties turn to the courts to seek a
right of participation where it is not guaranteed by law. When
Washington state election officials were organizing for a second
recount of the state’s 2.8 million ballots in 2004, a dispute ensued
over the right of campaign and party representatives to observe the
35
With their candidate trailing after the first recount by
count.
forty-two votes, Democratic party officials petitioned the state
supreme court for an order requiring county election officials to
allow observers to see each individual ballot as it was recounted a
30. Keith Ervin, Woman Registers Her Dog to Vote; Prosecutors Growl, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 22, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/local
news/2003758181_votingdog22m.html.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; Keith Ervin, Deal Reached with Woman Who Registered Dog to Vote,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
localnews/2003871083_votingdog06m.html.
35. Brief and Amended Motion of Petitioners at 2, 5, McDonald v. Reed, 153
Wash. 2d 201 (Wash. 2004) (No. 76321-6), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov/
office/news_docs/Recount/Democrat/Amd%20Mot%20Brief.pdf.
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36

second time. State statute created a general right to observe, but
37
did not specify its extent. The court found the existing statutory
language sufficient and declined the petition for additional
38
observer rights.
An interested party also asked a court to order more specific
observer rights in the recount of the 2006 election for Vermont
39
auditor of accounts. The court’s initial recount order stated, “The
candidates . . . or their representatives and the general public,
subject to reasonable restriction as may be imposed by the
respective County Clerks, may attend but may not participate in the
40
recount or impede it in any manner.” In a motion to the court,
the Republican candidate (who led by 137 votes after the initial
count) claimed that this order was being interpreted in some
counties to mean that observers could not speak with the
41
individuals conducting the recount. Those individuals were, by
statute and the court’s recount order, appointed by the political
42
parties having candidates in the election for auditor of accounts.
The court denied the request to clarify observers’ rights, leaving
43
the matter to the discretion of each county clerk.
The most obvious reason states would adopt laws allowing
citizen monitoring functions is to increase the resources dedicated
to election oversight by bringing private actors into the process.
Where election administrators operate with limited staffs and
budgets, private parties can increase the scrutiny of elections
processes and improve the chances errors or fraud will be
identified. But this is not the only reason offered for the existence
of private party monitoring laws. A report from Project Vote, an
44
affiliate of ACORN, describes the origin of private monitoring
36. Id. at 19–21.
37. Id.; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE 434-261-020 (West 2007).
38. McDonald, 153 Wash. 2d at 206.
39. Motion for Clarification of Respondent at 1, In re Thomas M. Salmon, No.
714-11-06 (Vt. Wash. County Ct. Nov. 7, 2006).
40. In re Thomas M. Salmon, No. 714-11-06, at 3 (Vt. Wash County Ct. Nov.
21, 2006) (order for statewide recount).
41. Motion for Clarification of Respondent, supra note 39, at 1.
42. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2602(a) (2002 & Supp. 2007); In re Thomas M.
Salmon, supra note 40, at 2.
43. In re Thomas M. Salmon, No. 714-11-06 (Vt. Wash. County Ct. Dec. 5,
2006) (entry regarding motion).
44. See ACORN’s Links to Related Organizations, http://www.acorn.org/
index.php?id=4143 (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). These organizations also work
from the same address in Washington, D.C. See http://www.projectvote.org
(address for Project Vote) (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); http://www.acorn.org/
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statutes in more sinister terms: “History demonstrates that laws
allowing private citizens to challenge other citizens’ right to vote at
the polls are a relic of the Jim Crow era, a means to preserve private
and partisan control over elections. As such they should be
45
eliminated or tightly regulated.”
It may be true that some states adopted private election
monitoring statutes for reasons less noble than preserving the
46
But the presence of states in New
integrity of the process.
England (Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island) and on
the west coast (California and Washington) among those that allow
challenges at some point during the process indicates that more
factors are at work than residual Jim Crow influences.
Private monitoring statutes permit some or all of three
practices. The first is allowing private actors to challenge voter
47
registrations before election day. Such challenges, if successful,
have the effect of removing the challenged voter from the
48
registration rolls and preventing him or her from casting a ballot.
The second form of private monitoring is granting private actors
49
standing to challenge voters in person at a polling place. The
means of adjudicating these challenges and the effect if they
succeed vary widely from state to state, including barring the voter
from casting a ballot and requiring them to vote using a provisional
50
ballot subject to later review. The third way states allow private
participation is allowing private actors to challenge absentee ballots
at the verification stage, before they are removed from their outer
51
envelopes and tabulated.
E. Other Provisions for Private Monitoring and Enforcement
The concept of employing interested private parties to expand
enforcement efforts is not unique to elections. In fact, it is widely
index.php?id=4318 (address for District of Columbia office of ACORN) (last
visited Dec. 28, 2007).
45. Teresa James, Caging Democracy: A 50-Year History of Partisan Challenges to
Minority Voters, PROJECT VOTE, Sept. 2007, at 34, available at http://projectvote.org/
fileadmin/ProjectVote/Publications/Caging_Democracy_Report.pdf.
46. See id. at 7 (stating many state voter challenge laws have roots in the postReconstructionist Era).
47. See infra Part II.
48. See id.
49. See infra Part III.
50. See id.
51. See infra Part IV.
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employed in other areas of law. Private citizens can sue on behalf
of the government to recoup fraudulently obtained payments
52
under the False Claims Act. Individual workers can file suits to
53
remedy violations of the Davis-Bacon Act’s prevailing wage rules.
The federal do-not-call statute allows individuals who receive calls
in violation of the rules to sue the offending party for statutory
damages separate from any enforcement action the government
54
And under CERCLA, individuals may seek
may undertake.
55
payments from liable polluters. This list is hardly comprehensive.
Only four states—Alabama, Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming—prohibit the three private monitoring practices under
56
discussion. The others all, in various ways, give private parties
57
In fact, twelve
official standing to enforce election policies.
states—Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and Wisconsin—permit private parties to act in all three ways:
challenging voter registrations before an election, challenging
58
voters at the polls, and challenging absentee ballots.
II. PRE-ELECTION REGISTRATION CHALLENEGES
One of the most extensive and bitterly contested uses of the
right to challenge voter registrations before an election took place
in Washington state in 2005. As a direct result, the state legislature
made substantial changes to Washington’s law governing pre59
election challenges the following year. Twenty-nine states permit
pre-election challenges, subject to a wide range of time limitations
60
and procedures.
A. Washington State Registration Challenges in 2005
King County is the largest county in Washington, with nearly
61
one-third of the state’s population. It was also the epicenter of the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

31 U.S.C. § 3730b (2000).
40 U.S.C. § 3144a(2) (effective Aug. 21, 2002).
47 U.S.C. § 227b(3) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
See infra notes 91, 122, and 188.
See id.
See id.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra note 91.
See King County Quick Facts, U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.
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dispute over the 2004 governor’s election, which led to two
recounts and an election contest trial that lasted until June of
62
2005. Following that dispute, the King County Republican Party
sought to correct some of the flaws it believed still existed in the
county’s election system before the election for county executive
63
on November 8, 2005.
Washington permits any registered voter to challenge another
64
The King County
voter’s registration before an election.
Republicans decided to use this right in an effort to correct errors
on the county’s voter registration rolls. They first challenged
approximately two thousand registrations they believed were
duplicates, representing the same voter registered more than
65
once.
Duplicate registrations are a substantial concern in
Washington because the state allows voters to select a permanent
66
no-excuse absentee status.
Voters in that status automatically
67
receive a ballot by mail for each election. So, if a voter has more
than one registration that voter will receive more than one ballot,
with each appearing to be sent and returned legitimately.
The next step for the King County Republicans came on
October 26, when they submitted a second list of challenges. This
list included 1944 names and was based on the claim that the
addresses on the registrations were not legitimate residences but
68
instead storage facilities or private mailbox services.
Democrats vigorously opposed the registration challenges.
The Democratic chairman of the County Council, Larry Phillips,
asked County Prosecutor Norm Maleng to explore perjury charges
against the person who signed the challenge forms, King County
GOP Vice Chairwoman Lori Sotelo, claiming Sotelo lacked
personal knowledge that the voters did not live at the addresses
census.gov/qfd/states/53/53033.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). The 2000
census counted 1,737,034 people living in King County and 5,894,121 in
Washington state. Id.
62. See Timothy Egan, Washington Candidate Wages Endless Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2005, at A13.
63. Sharon Pian Chan, GOP Questions More Registrations, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
25, 2005, at B2.
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.820 (2006).
65. Keith Ervin & Justin Mayo, Voter Names Found Twice, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
13, 2005, at B1.
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.040 (2005).
67. Id.
68. Gregory Roberts, Challenging the GOP Challenge in King County, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 15, 2005, at B2.
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69

where they were registered. A Democratic lawyer argued that the
70
County
challenges should be dismissed without hearings.
Democratic chair Susan Sheary said the challenges infringed on
71
voters’ civil rights.
After some of the challenges were found to have been filed in
72
error, the Republicans withdrew 140 of them.
Meanwhile,
reporters investigated thirty addresses that accounted for more
than one thousand of the challenged registrations, and found that
twenty-nine of them were in fact private mailbox services as claimed
by the Republicans; the remaining address had already been
identified as an error and was included in the 140 challenges
73
previously withdrawn.
Further investigation by the media uncovered some additional
errors in the original list, most caused by challenging voters whose
street number and street name were the same as a storage facility
with the same street number and street name in another area or
74
city. The chairman of the state Republican party, Chris Vance,
acknowledged that the party’s data analyst had not compared cities
or geographic designations when matching voter registration
75
addresses to storage facility and private mail box facility addresses.
By the time challenge hearings began, the original list of 1944 was
reduced by 176 withdrawn challenges, seventy-six duplicate entries,
and over 200 voters who changed their registration addresses
76
before the election deadline.
With those deductions, roughly
three-quarters of the challenges remained.
The first hearings on the challenges were held November 17,
77
2005. At the hearings, Democratic lawyers argued that state law
required individuals challenging voters to attest not only that the
voter did not live at the address where he or she was registered, but
69. Eric Pryne, GOP Not Dropping Voter Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 10,
2005, at B4.
70. See Roberts, supra note 68, at B2.
71. Eric Pryne, Voter-Challenge Errors Mount, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005, at
B1 [hereinafter Pryne, Errors Mount].
72. Eric Pryne, GOP Admits it Erred in Challenging Some Voters’ Registration,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at A1.
73. Eric Pryne, Parties Clash Over Voter Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005,
at B1.
74. See Pryne, Errors Mount, supra note 71, at B1.
75. Id.
76. See More Mistakes in Voter Challenges, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at B3.
77. See Sam Skolnik, GOP Registration Objections Receive More Scrutiny; Few Voters
Show Up to Plead Case, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 18, 2005, at B1.
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78

also to provide the voter’s true address. The county canvassing
board first considered 192 challenges to registrations where the
79
voter cast a ballot in the November 8, 2005 election. The board
rejected three-fourths of the challenges, upholding only those
where voters themselves provided information showing they did
80
not live at the address where they were registered. The county’s
election director said that he voted to reject the challenges because
the challenger “did not prove conclusively that [the] voters [did]
81
not live at the addresses” where they were registered, effectively
endorsing the argument made by the lawyer for the Democratic
Party. At the same time, he acknowledged that it appeared most of
the challenged voters were in fact registered at private mailbox or
82
storage facilities. After the canvassing board’s action on the
challenges for voters who had cast ballots, the remaining
challenges were left to be resolved administratively by the elections
83
director.
B. Legislative Response to Washington Registration Challenges
The errors in handling the challenges and the politically
charged atmosphere when they were filed put the focus on the
challenge process rather than on the registrations. In response,
the Washington Legislature revised the challenge process in its
84
2006 session.
The revisions preserved the right to challenge
registrations, but imposed substantial new burdens on the
85
challenger.
Under the new Washington challenge provisions, a challenge
to a registration because the voter does not live at the residential
78. Eric Pryne, GOP May Need to Find Homes of Contested Voters, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2005, at B1.
79. See Gregory Roberts, Most Challenges on Voters Tossed: Ballots Will Now Be
Counted, Unlikely to Change Results, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 29, 2005, at
B1.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Eric Pryne, Most Challenged Ballots are Cleared to be Counted, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2005, at B1.
83. See Eric Pryne, Maleng: Voter Rolls Flawed, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at
B1.
84. Act Relating to Modifying Processes for Challenging Voter Registration,
2006 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 320 (S.S.B. 6362) (West), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/200506/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Law%20200/
6362-S.sl.pdf.
85. Id.
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address provided must include one of two specific elements. The
86
The second is
first is the challenged voter’s actual address.
evidence of due diligence, demonstrated by following all of five
steps: sending a letter with return receipt requested, visiting the
address and interviewing persons there, searching telephone
directories, searching property records, and searching the
87
statewide voter registration database.
Imposing these
requirements means that cost factors will make large-scale
challenges such as those filed in 2005 almost impossible in the
future, even where there is evidence the registration addresses are
per se invalid (for example, by reason of being private mailbox
facilities that cannot serve as a residence). The bill did clarify the
requirement that registrations include the actual physical residence
88
of the voter.
The Washington Legislature also required that challenges be
filed sooner. For existing registrations, challenges must now be
89
filed at least 45 days before an election. For new registrations
submitted less than 60 days before an election, the challenge must
90
be filed at least 10 days before the election.
C. State Laws on Pre-election Challenges
Twenty-nine states permit private-party challenges of voter
91
registrations before Election Day.
In six of these—California,
Georgia, Ohio, Texas, Washington and West Virginia—pre86. Id. at § 4.
87. Id.
88. Id. at § 2.
89. Id. at § 5.
90. Id.
91. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2213 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-101(1) (2000 &
Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 2012 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 101.111(3) (2002
& Supp. 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-229 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-25(a)
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-431 (2001); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-12 (2003); IOWA
CODE § 48A.14(1) (1999 & Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 3-602(a)
(2002 & Supp. 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 48 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
168.512 (1989); MINN. STAT. § 201.195 subdiv. 1 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-63
(2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-301(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.547 (2002);
N.M. STAT. § 1-4-22 (2004); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-218 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16385(a) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24(a) (2007); 25 PA. STAT. § 1329(a)
(2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-9.1-28(a) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-5-230 (1977 &
Supp. 2006); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 16.091(2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-202
(2003 & Supp. 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-431 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE §
29A.08.810 (2005 & Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE § 3-2-28(a) (2006); WIS. STAT. §
6.48(1)(a) (2004 & Supp. 2006).
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registration challenges are the only private party role allowed;
92
polling place and absentee ballot challenges are not permitted. A
few states restrict the time when pre-election challenges may be
filed. Colorado allows them no later than sixty days before an
93
election. In Florida, any elector may challenge another voter’s
right to vote not sooner than thirty days before the election (but
94
the challenged voter may still cast a provisional ballot). Nevada
allows registration challenges only between thirty and twenty-five
95
days before an election. New Mexico requires challenges to be
96
made at least forty-two days before an election, and North
97
Carolina at least twenty-five days. The deadline in Ohio is not
98
later than twenty days before the election, and in Utah it is two
99
business days before the start of voting. Along with Washington,
whose time for challenges was changed to forty-five days before the
election for existing registrations and ten days before for new
100
101
registrations after the 2005 challenges discussed above, these
are the only states that impose time limits on their pre-registration
challenges.
In a sign of concern about large-scale challenges, New York
requires that each challenge affidavit may refer to only one voter
102
registration.
Some states also ban malicious or frivolous
103
challenges, or impose a probable cause standard.
III. POLLING PLACE CHALLENEGES
Challenges to voter registrations address questions about voter
eligibility before election day. In thirty-nine states, private parties—
usually the established political parties—are allowed through
92. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2213 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-229 (2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24(a) (2007); 25 PA. STAT. § 1329(a) (2007); W. VA.
CODE § 3-2-28(a), (b) (2006).
93. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-101(1)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
94. FLA. STAT. § 101.111(3) (2002 & Supp. 2007).
95. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.547 (2002).
96. N.M. STAT. § 1-4-22(A) (2004).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-85(a) (2006).
98. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24 (A) (2007).
99. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-202(2)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2007).
100. Act of June 7, 2006, ch. 320, § 5, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws.
101. See supra Part II.A.
102. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-220(1) (2007).
103. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.111(4) (2002 & Supp. 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 168.512 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE 29A.08.810 (2005 & Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE
§ 3-9-7 (2006).
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designated individuals to challenge a voter on election day when
104
the voter appears at a polling place to cast a ballot. Many states
appear to treat pre-election registration challenges and polling
place challenges as alternative, rather than complementary, tools.
105
Twenty-two states allow one or the other, but not both.
In one documented incident from 2007, a polling place
challenger blocked an attempt to impersonate a voter in Hoboken,
106
New Jersey. The Hoboken incident demonstrated two theoretical
justifications for polling place challengers: they can bring
information and resources to bear that election officials cannot,
and valid voter registration may be used by someone other than the
registered voter to cast a ballot.
In advance of the 2004 presidential election, the parties
prepared an extensive plan to station challengers in polling places
107
in Ohio under the provisions of the state’s election code.
The
Democrats filed three lawsuits trying to bar challengers from the
108
Ohio polls despite their statutory right to be there, and those
104. ALASKA STAT. § 15.15.210 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-590 (2006);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-312 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-9-201 (West Supp. 2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-232 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4934 (1999); FLA.
STAT. § 101.111 (West Supp. 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-25 (2006); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 34-304 (Supp. 2007); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-23 (Supp. 2007); IND. CODE
§ 3-10-1-9 (2006); IOWA CODE § 49.79 (Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
117.315(3) (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:565 (2004); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, § 673 (Supp. 2006); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-311 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 85A (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
168.730 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. § 204C.12 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-571
(2007); MO. STAT. § 115.429(2) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-301 (2007);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-926 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.287(2) (2002); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 659:27, 666:4–:5 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:7 (West Supp. 2007);
N.M. STAT. § 1-2-21 (2003); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-502 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-87 (Supp. 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-06 (Supp. 2007); 25 PA.
STAT. § 2687(b) (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-19-22 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13810 (Supp. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-18-6.3 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7104(c) (Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-202 (Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17 § 2564 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-651 (Supp. 2007); WIS. STAT. § 6.925
(2004).
105. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and
West Virginia.
106. See infra Part III.A.
107. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004), stay
granted, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21, as it existed before the legislative
changes described in Part III.C infra, stated: “At any primary, special, or general
election, any political party . . . may appoint to any of the polling places in the
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109

suits were not resolved until a few hours before the polls opened.
As happened in Washington after the 2005 pre-election registration
challenges, the Ohio legislature stepped in and rewrote the state’s
110
election statute in the wake of the 2004 disputes.
Among the
states that allow polling place challengers, there are many
differences in the procedure for making a challenge and the effect
111
if one is upheld.
A. Hoboken, NJ—Anatomy of a Fraud
On June 12, 2007, the city of Hoboken, New Jersey held a
112
runoff election in the primary for the city council. That morning,
John Branciforte—a former zoning board president and nineteenyear resident of the city—was on his way to volunteer as an election
challenger at a polling place when he noticed two men standing in
a semi-circle of seven other men and handing out 3x5 index
113
cards. One of the men who had received a card later entered the
polling place where Branciforte was volunteering and signed in to
114
vote.
Branciforte challenged him, and a city worker asked the
man for identification, which prompted the man attempting to
115
vote to leave abruptly.
Branciforte followed him and called
116
police.
According to a police report, the man lived in a homeless
shelter and had signed in to vote in another person’s name
(Branciforte had suspected the index cards contained names of
registered voters and that the men receiving the cards were
117
instructed to impersonate them at the polls).
The man told
police that someone had come to the shelter that morning and
118
asked men outside if they wanted to make ten dollars.
county or city one person, a qualified elector, who shall serve as a challenger for
such party . . . .”
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. See infra Part III.C.
111. See infra Part III.D.
112. Madeline Friedman & Caren Lissner, Anatomy of Voter Fraud; Will Officials
Follow Up on Alleged $10 Vote Payoff?, HUDSON REP. (Hudson County, NJ, July 1,
2007), available at http://www.hudsonreporter.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=18535
598.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Apparently, Branciforte’s intervention prevented the homeless
119
Based on what
man from impersonating a voter at the polls.
Branciforte observed on his way to the polling place, it also seems
120
likely that there was an effort to enlist others in the same practice.
The candidate Branciforte was working for on Election Day and his
opponent both said they believed this incident was part of a larger
attempt by local political party organizations to influence the
121
election outcome.
This incident illustrates the positive side of polling place voter
challenges. Branciforte was able to prevent a fraudulent vote based
on his own knowledge and observations. Had he not been present,
there is no indication that the city election workers would have
challenged the person attempting to vote in someone else’s name.
B. Ohio 2004—Deadlock Over Challengers
Again, thirty-nine states allow private actors to challenge voters
122
in the polling place on election day and Ohio is one of them.
Leading up to the November 2, 2004 election, the two major
political parties arranged for several hundred challengers in one
Ohio county alone (Hamilton County, which includes the city of
123
Cincinnati). On October 27, two voters in Hamilton County filed
a suit in federal court in Cincinnati seeking to block the
124
Republicans’ polling place challengers. The next day, Democrats
filed another federal suit in Cleveland, also seeking to enjoin the
125
Republican challenger program. In a period of seven days from

119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See supra note 104.
123. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004), stay
granted, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
124. See id. at 529; see also Cindi Andrews, Dems Want Challengers Out,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2004, at 1C (reporting on testimony in the Spencer
case, including Hamilton County Democratic co-chairman Tim Burke’s concerns
that Republicans were targeting black voters); Gregory Korte, Dlott Rulings Could
Impact Vote, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 29, 2004, at 1A (reporting on status of
court cases over Republican efforts to combat alleged voter fraud, including
lawsuit by longtime Cincinnati civil rights leaders Marian and Donald Spencer).
125. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, No.
5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539 at *3-5 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004), stay
granted, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
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the time the first case was filed, these two cases generated seven
126
opinions, including two from the Supreme Court.
In the first case to be decided, the court explicitly weighed the
state’s compelling interest in preventing election fraud against the
127
The court
potential harm to the voters being challenged.
determined that the polling place challenger provisions were not
narrowly drawn to serve the state’s compelling interest for two
primary reasons: the availability of pre-election challenges by
private actors, and the presence of election officials in the polling
128
place.
The district court in the second case reached a similar
conclusion, also holding that the election day challenger statute
was not narrowly drawn and therefore excessively burdened the
129
right to vote. The court emphasized the ability of official election
judges to protect against fraud, the role of the Board of Elections
in screening registration applications to ensure only valid ones are
processed, and the availability of pre-election private party
130
challenges.
The court also observed that the secretary of state
and attorney general were in dispute over the role of private party
131
On October 29, the secretary of state announced
challengers.
that he would recommend banning private challengers from
132
polling places, while the attorney general countered that his duty
133
was to uphold the challenger statute as enacted by the legislature.
With less than eight hours remaining before the polls were
scheduled to open, a panel of the Third Circuit upheld a district
court order in yet a third path of litigation, enjoining Ohio
Republicans from using lists prepared before election day as the
134
The circuit court
basis for challenging voters in polling places.
126. See Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301 (2004); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v.
Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 04-4186, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22687 (3d Cir. Nov.
1, 2004), reh’g granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 22689 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2004), stay
denied, 543 U.S. 1304 (2004); Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539; Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 528–38.
127. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22539 at *20–21.
128. Id. at *21.
129. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
130. Id.
131. Id. (“How can the average election official or inexperienced challenger
be expected to understand the challenge process if the two top election officials
cannot?”).
132. Id. at 532.
133. Id. at 536–37.
134. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., No. 04-4186, 2004
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then granted a petition for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel’s
135
order, and stayed the district court’s injunction.
Meanwhile, a panel of the Sixth Circuit heard a consolidated
136
appeal of the Spencer and Summit County cases. The court granted
an emergency stay of the district court orders pending further
appeal, using an analytical approach different than that of the
137
district courts.
In the Sixth Circuit’s view, the plaintiffs were
unlikely to prevail on the threshold question of whether the
presence of challengers burdens the right to vote, because
“[c]hallengers may only initiate an inquiry process by precinct
judges” while the precinct judges made the final decision on the
138
voter’s status.
Recognizing that it was a close case, the court
weighed the balance in favor of leaving the statutory provisions for
private challengers in place:
[I]f the plaintiffs are not correct in their view of the law,
the State will be irreparably injured in its ability to execute
valid laws, which are presumed constitutional, for keeping
ineligible voters from voting. . . . It is particularly harmful
to such interests to have the rules changed at the last
139
minute.
The plaintiffs in both the Third and Sixth Circuit cases asked
the Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals orders
overturning the district courts.
Justice Stevens denied the
application in the consolidated Spencer and Summit County cases in
large part because it was impossible as a practical matter for the
Court to review and rule upon the case materials in the limited
140
time available before the polls opened. In the Democratic National
Committee v. Republican National Committee case, Justice Souter
denied the application for stay when the lone individual voter who

U.S. App. LEXIS 22687 (3d Cir. Nov. 1, 2004), vacated, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
22689 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (en banc).
135. Id.
136. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388
F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
137. See id. at 550 (reasoning that the factors to be considered in determining
whether an order should be stayed are the same factors used to determine
whether to issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction).
138. Id. at 551.
139. Id.
140. Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2004).
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was party to the case filed a pleading with the Court disclosing that
141
she had already voted without challenge.
When voting proceeded on November 2 after this epic flurry
of litigation, the incumbent President George W. Bush defeated
John Kerry in Ohio by 118,601 votes, 2,859,768 to 2,741,167,
securing Ohio’s electoral votes and the presidency for a second
142
term. Years later, Democrats continue to argue that Bush’s Ohio
143
victory was procured through fraud.
C. Legislative Response to Dispute Over Ohio Poll Challengers
Following the extensive litigation over polling place
challengers in 2004, the Ohio Legislature enacted significant
144
changes to the state’s laws governing election day challenges.
The legislature required pre-election challenges by private parties
145
to be brought no later than twenty days before an election. More
dramatically, the legislature abolished private challengers in
polling places, replacing all references to challengers with the term
146
“observers.”
The revised law allows only election judges to
147
challenge voters at the polls on election day. As a counterbalance
to shutting out private actors from election day challenges, the
legislature required election officials to mail a nonforwardable
148
piece of mail to each registered voter before each election. If the
141. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 543 U.S. 1304, 1304
(2004).
142. Official Results 2004, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/ElectionsVoter/
results2004.aspx?Section=135 (last visited Nov. 20, 2007).
143. See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Was the 2004 Election Stolen?, ROLLING
STONE, June 1, 2006, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/10432
334/was_the_2004_election_stolen (quoting Sen. Christopher Dodd, Democrat of
Connecticut, as saying Ohio’s Republican secretary of state “was determined to
guarantee a Republican outcome.”).
144. Act of Jan. 31, 2006, No. 65, § 1, 2006 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. L-2 (West),
available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/JournalText126/HJ-01-31-06.pdf.
145. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.24 (West 2007).
146. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (West 2007):
At any primary, special, or general election, any political party supporting
candidates to be voted upon at such election and any group of five or
more candidates may appoint to the board of elections or to any of the
precincts in the county or city one person, a qualified elector, who shall
serve as observer for such party or such candidates during the casting and
counting of the ballots . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
147. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2006), invalidated by Boustani v.
Blackwell, 460 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.19(A) (West 2007).
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mail is returned, voters will be required to show identification the
149
next time they attempt to vote.
Even though Ohio’s legislative changes eliminate private
challengers at the polls, some activists have treated the new
legislation as if it were designed to make it easier to challenge
voters. A former lawyer in the Justice Department’s voting rights
section said the changes “make one wonder whether there will be
150
new efforts to have massive challenges in the future.”
D. Procedures Governing Polling Place Challenges
In addition to challengers, who have official standing to
participate in the election process by raising challenges, almost all
151
states allow observers in polling places.
The effect of a challenge varies from state to state. In Arizona,
if a majority of the polling place’s election board decides that a
challenge is valid, the voter casts a provisional ballot instead of a
152
That process gives the voter a second bite at the
regular ballot.
apple, creating an opportunity for a ballot to be counted if the
provisional ballot is deemed valid.
When a voter is challenged at the polls in Hawaii, the
challenge is immediately considered and decided by the election
153
officials in the precinct. If the officials uphold the challenge, the
voter either is prevented from voting or may appeal the decision to
154
the board of registration.
For an appeal, the voter completes a
ballot that is sealed in an envelope to be reviewed by the board and
counted or not depending on the board’s ruling (the functional
155
equivalent of a provisional ballot).
In Maine, a challenged voter casts a ballot that is counted with
the regular ballots but marked with a number that is recorded on a
156
“challenge certificate” and kept sealed with the voting materials.
The word “challenged” also is marked next to the voter’s name on
149.
150.

§ 3501.19(C).
Greg Gordon, States’ New Laws Help GOP Raise Voter Challenges,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 27, 2007, at A1.
151. West Virginia prohibits anyone other than election officers or voters
going to or from the election room to vote to be within 300 feet of the entrance to
the polling place. W. VA. CODE § 3-1-37(a) (2006).
152. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-592(C) (2006).
153. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-25(b) (2006).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 673(3) (Supp. 2006).
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157

the precinct roster.
After the election, if the challenged ballots
could affect the outcome, the challenge certificates are unsealed
158
and a determination of the challenges is made.
Wisconsin also
159
marks a serial number directly on a challenged ballot.
A challenged voter in Michigan or Minnesota is asked a series
of questions by a precinct election official to determine his or her
160
qualifications.
If the official determines based on the answers
that the voter is not qualified to vote in that precinct, the person is
161
not entitled to receive a ballot and vote.
When a challenge is upheld in New Mexico, the voter
completes a ballot that is placed in an envelope with the word
162
“rejected” and the voter’s name written on the outside.
The
163
A
envelope is then placed in the ballot box and not counted.
164
If a voter is challenged
similar procedure applies in Tennessee.
successfully in Vermont, the voter is denied access to the voting
area and cannot vote except by obtaining a court order before the
165
polls close.
IV. ABSENTEE BALLOT CHALLENEGES
Following a series of indictments for absentee ballot fraud in
2007, an official in Hale County, Alabama, credited the presence of
political party monitors in the elections office with reducing the
number of absentee ballots cast, many of which were presumed
166
This is one example of private party monitoring
fraudulent.
having an effect on the voting process, even where the Alabama
167
monitors did not have the right to challenge the absentee ballots.
Although challenging absentee ballots is conceptually similar to
challenging voters at a polling place, the actual practice and
process is different because of the way absentee ballots are
157. Id. § 673(3-A).
158. Id. § 696(1).
159. WIS. ADMIN. CODE EL. § 6.95 (Supp. 2006).
160. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.729 (2005); MINN. STAT. § 204C.12 subdiv. 3
(Supp. 2007).
161. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.729 (2005); § 204C.12, subdiv. 3 (Supp. 2007).
162. N.M. STAT. § 1-12-22(A) (2003).
163. Id.
164. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-125 (2003).
165. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2564 (2002).
166. Stephanie Taylor, Two Accused of Voter Fraud In Hale County, TUSCALOOSA
NEWS, Aug. 17, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/
20070817/LATEST/70817026.
167. ALA. CODE § 17-11-11(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
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handled. Relatively few states—twenty-two—permit challenges of
168
absentee ballots, and the choice of whether to allow the practice
does not seem to correlate to the proportion of a state’s votes that
169
are cast by absentee.
A. Monitors Making a Difference in Alabama
In Greensboro, Alabama, two people—one a former city
council member—were indicted on August 16, 2007 on charges
170
related to absentee ballot fraud.
The allegations involved the
casting of apparently fraudulent absentee ballots in two Democratic
171
primary elections in Alabama’s Hale County.
One of those elections was a May 2005 primary for an open
172
Candidate Ralph
seat in the state house of representatives.
Howard surpassed opponent Albert Turner, Jr. in Hale County by a
173
vote of 2264 to 1380. But while only forty-three of Howard’s 2264
votes were cast by absentee ballot, Turner received 813 of his 1380
174
votes by absentee.
When he announced the charges, Alabama Attorney General
Troy King said that Hale County had a history of problems: “Very
rarely do we have elections in Hale County that we do not receive
complaints . . . .
This has been a systemic problem of
175
corruption.” Nonetheless, even before the indictments were filed
there were signs that the situation might be improving. A clerk in
the county probate judge’s office said the number of absentee
ballots cast had been declining since 2000, falling from thousands
176
per election to only 300 in the most recent.
Most interestingly,
the clerk said that one factor in the decrease was the presence of
poll watchers from candidates and political parties in the absentee
177
vote office during the five weeks it was open.
Only a few days before the Alabama indictments, a report
emerged in neighboring Mississippi that more than 30% of the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See infra note 188.
See infra Part IV.B.
Taylor, supra note 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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absentee ballots cast in an August 2007 election were fraudulent.
The issue was taken seriously enough that the ballots were
transported to a state crime lab and analyzed for DNA and
179
fingerprints.
A few months later, a commissioner in Refugio County, Texas,
resigned after admitting to a fraud scheme involving absentee
180
ballots in his 2006 election. He was reported to have had county
residents sign absentee ballot applications that were sent to his
supporters and then signed by the applicants after being
181
completed.
B. The Different Challenge of Monitoring Absentees
The Alabama and Mississippi examples cited above illustrate
problems that can arise in casting absentee ballots and how
monitors or challengers could seek to identify and prevent them.
182
Nationwide 12% of ballots were cast by absentee ballot in 2004,
but some states—especially in the West—had absentee rates that
were much higher: 68.7% in Washington, 40.8% in Arizona
(including both absentee and early votes, which are cast using the
same process), 33.2% in California (accounting for over four
million ballots), and 100% in Oregon, the nation’s only all vote-by183
mail state.
The types of activities that challengers can monitor for
absentee ballots are different than those at polling places. In
absentee processing, ballots are handled by election officials at a
central office, but they are handled for an extended period of
184
time. Ballot accountability—reconciling the number of tabulated
ballots to the number of legitimate voters casting them—can be far
more complex for tens or hundreds of thousands of absentee
ballots in a central office than for a few hundred ballots in a

178. Andy Wise, Tunica County Ballot Investigation Targets Circuit Clerk’s Office,
WREG-TV (Memphis), Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1887759/posts (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
179. Id.
180. Tara Bozick, Refugio Commissioner Admits to Voter Fraud: Commissioner
Resigns, Pleads Guilty to State Jail Felony, VICTORIA ADVOCATE, Oct. 11, 2007, available
at 2007 WLNR 19836561.
181. Id.
182. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-6.
183. Id. at 4–7.
184. GARBER, supra note 7, at 23.
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185

precinct polling place. Absentee voting often is cited as the most
186
likely source of election fraud.
C. Absentee Ballot Challenge Rules in the States
Compared to the twenty-nine states that allow pre-election
registration challenges and the thirty-nine that allow election day
challenges at polling places, a smaller number—twenty-two—
187
The states that allow the
permit challenges to absentee ballots.
practice do not seem to base the choice on the percentage of their
ballots cast by absentee. The table below shows the states allowing
absentee challenges and the percentage of their votes cast by
188
absentee in 2004:
Arizona
Iowa
New Mexico
Alaska
Michigan
Florida

41%
30%
20%
20%
18%
18%

185. The failure to perform an accurate absentee ballot reconciliation figured
prominently in the election contest litigation following the 2004 Washington
governor’s election. Keith Ervin, Election Manager Linked to False Report, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 19, 2005, at B1; Keith Ervin, Higher-up Linked to Flawed Report, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 21, 2005, at B1; Keith Ervin, King County Ballot Numbers Don’t Add Up,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 25, 2005, at A16.
186. See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL
REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY (2006), at 9, available at
http://www.eac.gov/clearinghouse/docs/reports-and-surveys2006electioncrimes.
pdf/attachment_download/file; CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTION MGMT &
AM. UNIV., BLDG. CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005), at 46, available at
http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf.
187. ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.203 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-552 (2006);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-312 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-159p(a) (2002); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5513 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 101.6104 (2002); FLA. STAT. §
101.68(2)(c)(2) (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1009 (2001); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/19-10 (Supp. 2007); IOWA CODE § 49.79 (1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.087
(LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1315 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21-A, § 757 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 54, § 96 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 168.769a (West 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.105 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
659:51 (2007); N.M. STAT. § 1-6-25 (West 2003); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-506 (Mckinney
2007); 25 PA. STAT. § 3146.8(e) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-810 (1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-7-104(c) (2003); WIS. STAT. § 7.41 (West 2004); WIS. ADMIN. CODE
El. Bd. § 9.04 (2007), WIS. ADMIN. CODE El. Bd 9.05 (West 2007). Oregon is not
included on the list because 100 percent of its votes are cast by mail; the state does
allow challenges to those ballots. OR. REV. STAT. § 253.700 (2003).
188. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 4–6.
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National Average
New Hampshire
Connecticut
Wisconsin
Missouri
Idaho
Massachusetts
Kentucky
Delaware
Arkansas
New York
Illinois
Tennessee
Louisiana
Maine
South Carolina

589

12%
9%
9%
9%
7%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
2%
1%
0%
0%

Six of the twenty-two states are above the national average in
percentage of votes cast by absentee, and sixteen are below the
average. They also represent a wide range of geography.
The procedures for challenging absentee ballots vary less than
those for challenging voters at the polls. This may reflect in part
the different nature of the events. A poll challenger is faced with a
voter who is present at the time to cast a ballot, and who may or
may not come with identification or clear answers to questions to
resolve the challenge. The challenge must be resolved quickly to
determine whether or not the voter can vote (or a provisional
ballot can be accepted, which effectively puts off the challenge
determination to a later date). When an absentee ballot is
challenged, the ballot is a fixed document, already containing
information about the voter (otherwise it could not have been sent
and returned successfully), and without an impatient voter present,
there is time to evaluate and investigate the information available.
Illinois allows poll watchers to observe the processing of
absentee ballots and issue challenges, and the state also accounts
189
for a unique aspect of absentee ballots: the signature match. Poll
watchers in Illinois have a specific right to observe the election
judges comparing the signature on the ballot envelope with the

189.

10 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/19-10 (West 2003).
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190

signature on the voter’s registration card.
This allows them the
opportunity to challenge not only based on the eligibility of the
registered voter to cast a ballot, but also on a claim that the ballot
was submitted by a person other than the registered voter
(equivalent to the polling place impersonation in the Hoboken
incident described earlier).
Kentucky’s process for challenging absentee ballots includes
an important time limitation. All absentee ballot challenges must
be in writing and in the county clerk’s possession by 10 a.m. on
191
election day; however, absentee ballots will be counted if they are
192
received by the time polls close. Consequently, a person wishing
to challenge an absentee ballot either must make the challenge
based solely on the request for the ballot, without knowing whether
it was returned, or must forego the opportunity to challenge any
ballots arriving on election day.
IV. CONCLUSION
A large majority of states—forty-five—allow pre-election voter
registration challenges, polling place challenges, or both, by
private, non-governmental parties.
This represents a strong
endorsement of private monitoring and enforcement processes by
the states. As the use of absentee ballots expands, the number of
states allowing challenges to absentee ballots may grow from its
current twenty-two to reach a majority as well.
Private monitoring and enforcement can help identify errors
and misconduct in elections, increasing the level of integrity
beyond what government resources can provide.
It also
acknowledges the role of key stakeholders in what is, at its core, an
adversarial system.
With high-profile, very close elections becoming frequent, the
candidates and political parties whose success and—literally—
fortunes depend upon winning those elections are likely to look
more and more to available private enforcement mechanisms as a
tool for gaining the tiny edge they need to finish on top. As the
legislatures in Washington and Ohio showed, though, using private
enforcement tools too aggressively can backfire by causing them to
be restricted in the future.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.087(1) (LexisNexis 2004).
Id.
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